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Abstract
Recent theoretical research has identified many ways how contracts can be used as rent-
seeking devices vis-à-vis third parties, but there is no empirical evidence on this issue
so far. To test some basic qualitative properties of this literature, we develop a theo-
retical and empirical framework in the context of European professional soccer where
(incumbent) teams and players sign binding contracts which are, however, frequently
renegotiated when other teams (entrants) want to hire the player. Because they weaken
entrants in renegotiations, long-term contracts are useful rent-seeking devices for the con-
tracting parties. However, they also lead to allocative distortions in the form of deterring
efficient transfers. Since incumbent teams tend to benefit more from long-term contracts
in renegotiations than players do, these must be compensated ex ante by higher wages
when agreeing to a long-term contract. Using data from the German “Bundesliga”, our
model predictions are broadly confirmed.
Keywords: Strategic contracting, rent-seeking, empirical contract theory, long-term
contracts, breach of contract,
JEL classification: L14, J63, L40, L83
1 Introduction
Motivation Recent theoretical research has identified a variety of ways how contracts
can be used as rent-seeking devices vis-à-vis third parties. Examples include breach
penalties, exclusivity clauses, retroactive rebates or, in the context of labor markets,
long-term contracts and non-compete clauses. As a result of such rent-seeking incentives,
various forms of inefficiencies may arise, for example with respect to entry decisions
(Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Chung, 1992), investment incentives (Spier and Whinston,
1995; Segal and Whinston, 2000; Feess and Muehlheusser, 2003), or the allocation of
workers (Posner, Triantis, and Triantis, 2004).
As detailed below, the frameworks considered in this literature differ along a variety of
important dimensions, but they all share two common properties. First, while potentially
detrimental from a social point of view, the rent-seeking devices are jointly beneficial for
the contracting parties. Second, not only outsiders, but also some of the contracting
parties themselves may be harmed in the course of the contractual relationship and must
hence be compensated when signing the contract. For example, when a buyer is likely to
breach in the future, she might accept a stiff penalty clause only when being compensated
ex ante by paying a low price.1 To the best of our knowledge, all research in this area is
purely theoretical, and there is no empirical evidence so far.
Framework In this paper, we test some of the main qualitative properties of strategic
contracting models. In doing so, we develop a theoretical and empirical contracting frame-
work in the context of European professional soccer. As the incentive structure exhibits
all the general properties described above, our analysis points to long-term contracts as
useful rent-seeking devices.
In European professional soccer, the contracts between teams and players are in prin-
ciple binding throughout the agreed duration. However, they are frequently renegotiated
before they expire when other teams want to hire the player.2 In the course of such
1The issue of ex ante compensation is usually not explicitly analyzed in the literature when the focus
is on investment incentives which are not affected by the ex ante division of surplus (see e.g. Hart and
Moore, 1988; Spier and Whinston, 1995). The same is true for other contexts such as asset ownership
where incomplete contracting frameworks are used (see e.g. Hart and Moore, 1990; Roider, 2004).
2In contrast to US sports, it is common for European soccer players to play for several teams through-
out their careers. Thereby, transfers between teams often take place while a player’s contract with his
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a renegotiation process between the player, the current team (incumbent) and the new
team (entrant), the threat points are determined by the remaining duration of the player’s
contract with the incumbent team. In particular, according to long-standing regulations
in this sector, holding a valid contract with the player gives the incumbent team the
right to veto the transfer, which allows it to extract a payment from the new team (the
transfer fee) for letting the player go. This transfer fee will be increasing in the remaining
duration of the player’s contract, as the incumbent team can threaten to “lock up” the
player for a longer period of time. As a result, when a transfer is agreed upon, the longer
the player’s remaining contract duration, the lower the entrant’s renegotiation payoff,
and the higher thus the joint renegotiation payoff of the contracting parties (i.e. player
and incumbent team). The player alone, however, might be worse off in renegotiations
under a long-term contract which calls for compensation ex ante in the form of a higher
wage in the incumbent team.3
Specifically, we develop a model where a player and the incumbent team bargain over
the duration of their contract and the player’s wage. After the contract is signed, a new
team may want to hire the player. This team first decides on acquiring information about
the player’s value, and it then triggers a renegotiation process with the contracting parties
whenever the player is more valuable in the new team. Hence, given that renegotiation
occurs, the contract terms affect the distribution of surplus only, but not the transfer
decision itself which is always ex post efficient.4
The social cost of long-term contracts is an inefficiently low frequency of renegoti-
ations, because the new team reaps only part of the renegotiation surplus, while fully
covering the (privately known) cost of information acquisition. As a result, the new
team’s investment incentive is the lower, the lower its renegotiation payoff. This latter
current team is still valid. In our data, this is the case in roughly 75% of all transfers.
3For the German Bundesliga, for example, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting that in
the course of contract negotiations, both teams and players have very well in mind the possibility of
a future transfer of the player, including the resulting payoff consequences. For example, according to
Meinolf Sprink, executive at Bayer 04 Leverkusen, “...the motive of shaping (later) transfer fees is always
present”. Furthermore, Claus Horstmann, CEO of 1. FC Köln (Cologne) says that “we use long-term
contracts to protect our investments...”. Source: Spiegel online, August 6, 2010, “Gib mir fünf!” (Give
me five!), http://www.spiegel.de/sport/fussball/0,1518,710282,00.html
4This is a standard feature of incomplete contracting models with renegotiation, see e.g. Hart and
Moore (1990), Spier and Whinston (1995), or Segal and Whinston (2000).
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payoff is decreasing in the remaining duration of the player’s contract with the incumbent
team, so that longer contracts reduce the frequency of renegotiation. Consequently, in
deciding on the contract duration, the contracting parties are facing the following trade-
off: the longer the duration of the contract, the higher their joint renegotiation payoff
when a transfer occurs, but the lower the likelihood of a transfer as the renegotiation
stage is reached less often.
Results The following predictions emerge from our theoretical framework: First, as
just pointed out, a player’s transfer probability is decreasing in the remaining duration
of his current contract which reduces allocative efficiency. Second, transfer fees (i.e. the
renegotiation payoff of incumbent teams) are increasing in the remaining duration of the
player’s contract and decreasing in the player’s wage in the incumbent team. Both results
are intuitive and are driven by the impact of the initial contract terms on the veto power
of the incumbent team.5 Third, a player’s wage in his new team (i.e. his renegotiation
payoff) is increasing in his wage in the incumbent team, but can be either increasing
or decreasing in the remaining duration of his initial contract. The first property is
again intuitive, and the second result is due to the fact that a player benefits from a
long remaining contract duration when his wage in the incumbent team is sufficiently
high. Fourth, regardless of the effect on the player alone, the joint renegotiation payoff
of the incumbent team and the player (i.e. transfer fee plus wage in the new team), is
increasing in the remaining duration of the player’s initial contract. This confirms the
role of contract durations as rent-seeking devices. Fifth, when a player is ex post harmed
by long-term contracts or benefits less in the renegotiation process than the incumbent
team, he is compensated ex ante by the incumbent team by receiving a higher wage.
To test our results, we use data from Germany’s top professional soccer league (“Bun-
desliga”). We have information on 422 contracts including duration and (base) wages, as
well as player- and team-specific information such as performance, position, experience,
or final league position and budgets, respectively. To test the impact of the remaining
contract durations on transfer probabilities, we estimate a multinomial logit model where,
at the end of each season, players may either change teams, re-new their contracts with
5Note that allocative distortions only arise when renegotiation does not occur (resulting in no transfer)
although the player would be more valuable in the new team. Because the renegotiation process itself is
efficient, a transfer is never agreed upon when the player is more valuable in the incumbent team.
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their current teams or simply continue an ongoing contractual relationships. We find that
on average, a longer remaining contract duration significantly reduces the probability of
being transferred. This clearly supports the view of contract duration affecting player
mobility.
Our predictions about renegotiation payoffs are also broadly supported by the data:
First, one additional year of remaining contract duration increases the average transfer
fee substantially. Second, a player’s wage in his new team is increasing in the wage in his
previous team. Third, in line with the ambiguity derived in the theoretical framework, we
do not find a significant impact of the remaining duration of the player’s previous contract.
Fourth, one more year of remaining contract duration increases the joint renegotiation
payoff of a player and his old team by more than 50 percent, suggesting that long-term
contracts are indeed useful rent-seeking devices. Finally, we find that incumbent teams
benefit more from long-term contracts than players do. According to our theory, this
calls for player compensation in form of a higher wage in the incumbent team. In fact,
controlling for ability, one more year of contract duration on average increases a player’s
annual wage by 24 percent.
Relation to the literature The role of contracts as rent-seeking devices has been
stressed in the economic literature since Diamond and Maskin (1979) who analyzed a
search model where parties contract with each other but continue to search for better
matches. They show that there is an incentive to stipulate high damages in the initial
contract as this will increase the payoff in the new partnership. As they note, ”the
rationale for these contracts is solely to ’milk’ future partners for damage payments”.
Aghion and Bolton (1987) emphasize the close relationship between breach penalties,
contract durations and an entrant’s “waiting” costs, as the penalty determines the ef-
fective duration of a contract. They show how excessive breach penalties tend to deter
efficient market entry.6 However, as pointed out by Spier and Whinston (1995), these in-
efficient entry decisions are driven by the absence of renegotiation, and they show that ex
post efficiency can be restored once renegotiation is possible. Similarly, Posner, Triantis,
and Triantis (2004) analyze the role of non-compete clauses in labor contracts. Again, the
inefficiencies generated by such contract clauses depend on whether or not renegotiation
6In similar vein, Chung (1992) shows that contracting parties have an incentive to choose socially
excessive damage clauses which also lead to ex post inefficiencies.
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is permitted.7
Our framework is in-between the two polar cases of excluding renegotiation altogether
and having a renegotiation process which any allocative inefficiency is eliminated, respec-
tively: we do allow for renegotiation, and transfers are also efficient when they occur.
However, the likelihood of renegotiation is endogenous and depends on the terms of the
contract. Another difference to Spier and Whinston (1995) is that they consider renego-
tiation between the initial contracting parties only, while also the entrant participates in
the renegotiation process in our framework.
Another inefficiency identified in the literature refers to relation-specific investment
incentives as considered in Spier and Whinston (1995), who show that inefficiencies of
strategic contracting may arise even when ex post efficiency is ensured by renegotiations
because the contract terms lead to inefficient levels of relation-specific investment. Segal
and Whinston (2000) analyze how the efficiency properties of exclusive dealing clauses
depend on the type of investments. Also focusing on investment incentives, Feess and
Muehlheusser (2003) compare the impact of different legal regimes in European profes-
sional soccer on teams’ incentives to invest in the training of young players. While long-
term contracts are also jointly beneficial for the contracting parties in renegotiations,
allocative inefficiencies are not taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple
theoretical framework for analyzing the issue of strategic contracting in our sports context.
Section 3 describes the data used for the empirical analysis in Section 4, in which the
model predictions are empirically tested. Section 5 discusses our findings and concludes.
2 The model
In the following, we consider a simple buyer-seller framework with the possibility of future
entry as considered in the literature on strategic contracting discussed above, and adopt
it to our context of European professional sports as follows:
At date −3, a player bargains with team i (the incumbent) over a contract stipulating
7A related issue is the controversy whether parties to a contract are able to commit not to renegotiate
(see e.g. Hart and Moore, 1999; Maskin and Tirole, 1999). Carbonell-Nicolau and Comin (2005) design
and implement an empirical test which, using data from the Spanish soccer league, leads them to reject
the commitment hypothesis.
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a duration T and a wage W per unit of time.8 The player’s career horizon is normalized
to last from date 0 until date 1, and his productivity in team i is Y > 0 per unit of time.9
At date −2, after the contract has been signed but before the player starts playing
for team i at date 0, a new team e (the entrant) may be interested in hiring him. The
player’s productivity in team e is Y + γ per unit of time where γ is a random variable
distributed on [−∞,∞] with density f(γ). However, to find out the true value of γ,
team e must make an investment decision I ∈ {0, 1}. For instance, it may need to
collect information about the player himself, it must figure out how well he fits in its
tactical system, or it must decide about alternative candidates. The investment cost z
is team e’s private information, and from the viewpoint of team i and the player at the
contracting stage, it is distributed on [0,∞] with density h(z). As in Aghion and Bolton
(1987), assuming private information with respect to a cost parameter of the entrant
is a convenient way of modeling the basic idea that rent-seeking motives might lead to
unwarranted and inefficient entry deterrence.10
At date −1, after the investment decision is made, team e decides whether or not to
enter negotiations with the contracting parties. We assume that the expected value of γ
is negative which ensures that team e will never want to negotiate without having chosen
to invest in information acquisition.11 As our focus is on inefficiencies created through
strategic contracting even when renegotiations are ex post efficient, we furthermore as-
sume that γ becomes common knowledge in the renegotiation process.
In line with the literature, we assume throughout that at each stage, multi-party
decisions are taken cooperatively by all parties involved at that stage, while (single-party)
8As will become clear below, because of a one-to-one relationship between contract duration and the
resulting payment (transfer fee) to the incumbent team in case a transfer occurs before the contract
expires, there is in principle no need to additionally stipulate a breach penalty in the contract. In
reality, such breach penalties are sometimes observed and can be interpreted as upper bound on team
i’s bargaining power.
9As is standard in the literature, this productivity is meant to capture the marginal revenue that can
be attributed to a player such as, for example, increases in TV money, merchandizing sales or premia
from international competitions.
10All that is needed for our results is that at the date of contracting, the contracting parties are facing
some uncertainty concerning future entrants’ willingness to hire the player.
11A similar assumption is made in Aghion and Tirole (1997) in the context of taking uninformed
investment decisions with respect to projects of unknown profitability.
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investment decisions are individually optimal:12 That is, the contract signed at date -3
maximizes the expected joint surplus of the player and team i, while at date −2, team
e will invest whenever the cost (z) is lower than its own expected renegotiation payoff.
Finally at date −1, given that team e has invested and triggered the renegotiation process,
the player is transferred whenever it is efficient to do so (i.e. when γ ≥ 0), regardless of
his contractual situation. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1.
Because of our assumption that γ is learned before date 0, the player might be traded
directly at date 0 without having played for team i at all. We make this assumption for
analytical simplicity, and because it is in line with the set-ups considered in the literature
on strategic contracting where trade occurs only after the arrival of new potential trading
partners. In reality, players will typically start playing in their incumbent teams before
being transferred to another team. All of our results can also be derived in a continuous
framework where productivity shocks can occur at any time so that the player plays for
both teams.
2.1 Benchmark
As for the efficient investment decision, a transfer takes place if and only if team e invests
and learns that γ ≥ 0. Therefore, expected social welfare SW (I) is given by
12As for our context, see e.g. Aghion and Bolton (1987), Spier and Whinston (1995) and Segal and
Whinston (2000). Moreover, also in the broader context of incomplete contracting models, canonicals
frameworks such as Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) exhibit this feature.
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SW (I) =

Y if I = 0
Y +
∫∞
0
γf (γ) dγ − z if I = 1 . (1)
Without investment, the player will play for team i with productivity Y throughout his
whole career. With investment, a transfer takes place when γ ≥ 0, so that his productivity
is Y for all γ ≤ 0 and Y + γ otherwise. This leads to a threshold z̃f :=
∫∞
0
γf (γ) dγ,
such that it is efficient for team e to invest for all z ≤ z̃f .
2.2 Date -1: Renegotiation
Assume that team e has invested z and has learned that γ ≥ 0. Then, a change of teams
takes place, and the division of the renegotiation surplus γ per unit of time depends on
each party’s veto power. Consistent with the legal environment in European professional
soccer since 1995, team i can credibly threaten to veto the transfer as long as the player
has a valid contract, but it has no more veto power after the contract has expired.13 Hence,
this contrasts with a reserve clause as known in US sports, and longterm contracts are
in fact binding.14
To capture this crucial aspect, we use the Shapley value concept to determine the
surplus division at each point in time. When the player’s contract is still valid (from
date 0 until date T ), all three parties are involved. By contrast, for the remaining
period (1− T ) where the contract has expired, team i fully loses its veto power, and the
bargaining effectively occurs between the player and team e only. An important aspect
we need to take into account is that in this case, it would be quite unrealistic to assume
that the player’s threat point is zero. Instead, we assume that he can always obtain
a “threat point” payoff equal to his base productivity Y . For example, this property
would naturally emerge under the assumption that, after contract expiration, there is
competitive bidding for the player’s services by several other teams (including team i),
13This legal regime was implemented by the so-called “Bosman judgment” of the European Court of
Justice in 1995, see Court of Justice of the European Communities, Case C-415/93. The data used in
the empirical part are all taken from this period.
14One might argue that players can reduce the incumbent team’s veto power simply by threatening
not to perform well on the pitch. However, all we need is the realistic assumption that holding a valid
contract with a player increases a team’s veto power in the renegotiation process.
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and where the player’s productivity in each of these teams is equal to Y .15
Denoting by πcj(γ,W ) ≥ 0 the renegotiation payoff of party j = i, e, p per unit of time
depending on whether the player has a valid contract with team i or not, c = V,N , we
get the following result (see Appendix A for details):
Lemma 1 Using the Shapley value concept, the renegotiation payoffs per unit of time
are as follows:
(i) For the period [0, T ] where the player’s contract is still valid:
πVi = Y −W +
1
3
γ, πVp = W +
1
3
γ, and πVe =
1
3
γ.
(ii) For the period [T, 1] where the player’s contract has expired:
πNi = 0, π
N
p = Y +
1
2
γ, and πNe =
1
2
γ.
Clearly, πVi > π
N
i = 0 as team i benefits from its veto power as long as the contract is
still valid. Since team i becomes irrelevant after the contract has expired, team e and the
player each reap half of the renegotiation surplus.16 Note, however, that the player may
nevertheless benefit from a valid contract when his wage in team i is sufficiently high as
πNp > π
V
p if and only if W < Y +
1
6
γ.17
Total renegotiation payoffs over time are given by simply adding up over the periods
with and without valid contract:
Πj(γ, T,W ) = T · πVj (γ,W ) + (1− T ) · πNj (γ,W ) ∀j = i, e, p. (2)
Result 1 Total renegotiation payoffs have the following properties:
15The alternative assumption that such alternative employment opportunities do not exist, leading to
a threat point payoff of zero for the player, would clearly be unrealistic in the present context.
16These features emerge naturally also for alternative specifications of the renegotiation process; see
e.g. Segal and Whinston (2000), Burguet, Caminal, and Matutes (2002), Feess and Muehlheusser (2003)
and Terviö (2006).
17This feature of the Shapley value is quite intuitive in our context. For instance, assume that Y = 80
and γ = 100 so that the player gets 80 + 12 · 100 = 130 per unit of time for period (1 − T ) where his
contract has expired. Hence, whenever W > 130, he will clearly get more than 130 in renegotiations as
long as his contract is valid; otherwise he would prefer to veto the transfer. Clearly, for smaller values
of W , the opposite might hold so that the player benefits from being out of contract.
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(i) with respect to the player’s wage in team i (W ), it is (weakly) decreasing for team i,
neutral for team e, and (weakly) increasing for the player. The joint renegotiation
payoff of the player and team i is independent of W .
(ii) with respect to the remaining contract duration (T ), it is increasing for team i,
decreasing for team e, and ambiguous for the player. The joint of renegotiation
payoff of the player and team i is increasing in T .
All properties follow directly from Lemma 1. The player’s wage in team i increases
his payoff when staying with team i, and this also increases his payoff when a change of
team occurs. The opposite holds for team i. As these two effects offset each other, W is
neutral for their joint renegotiation payoff and thus also for team e. Hence, W is a purely
distributive matter and hence not influenced by rent-seeking considerations.
The crucial point in part (ii) is that, even in cases where the player’s payoff alone is
decreasing in T , the joint payoff of the player and team i is always increasing in T . This
follows immediately from the fact that team e’s payoff is decreasing in T .18
Of course, in our context the renegotiation payoffs of team i and the player can
be naturally interpreted as the transfer fee and the player’s annual wage in team e,
respectively.19
2.3 Date −2: Investment
Given the outcome of the renegotiation process, team e will invest whenever its expected
renegotiation payoff net of investment costs z is non-negative. It follows that there exists
a threshold z̃(T ) :=
∫∞
0
Πe(γ, T )f (γ) dγ such that the investment occurs for all z ≤ z̃(T ).
Moreover, team e’s investment incentives are decreasing in T as
z̃′(T ) =
∫ ∞
0
∂Πe(γ, T )
∂T
f (γ) dγ < 0. (3)
Finally, since Πe(γ, T ) < γ for all γ ≥ 0, it follows that z̃(T ) < z̃f for all T ≥ 0. As a
result, compared to the efficiency benchmark, there is under-investment even for T = 0,
because team e bears the full cost of the investment (z), but gets only part of the social
18To see this, simply note that Πp(·) + Πi(·) ≡ Y + γ −Πe(·), and ∂Πe∂T < 0 ∀T, γ.
19Since the player’s career horizon is normalized to one, his total renegotiation payoff equals his
“average” renegotiation payoff per unit of time.
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gain in case of a transfer (Πe < γ). And as z̃
′(T ) < 0, the under-investment problem is
aggravated by longer contract durations.
¿From the viewpoint of the contracting parties who do not observe z, the probability
of a transfer is then given by Pr (z ≤ z̃(T )) · Pr (γ ≥ 0) which is, again due to z̃′(T ) < 0,
also strictly decreasing in T . We summarize as follows:
Result 2 The probability that the player will be transferred is decreasing in the remaining
duration of his contract.
2.4 Date −3: Contracting
The duration of the contract agreed upon by the player and team i maximizes their
expected joint payoff:
J(T ) = Y + Pr (z ≤ z̃ (T ))
[∫ ∞
0
(γ − Πe(γ, T )) f (γ) dγ
]
. (4)
The player and team i get at least Y with certainty. When a transfer takes place (i.e.
when team e invests and γ > 0), then in addition they get the total renegotiation surplus
γ minus team e’s share of it. Recall that team e’s (renegotiation) payoff is independent
of W , so W does also not enter J(T ).
If interior, the optimal contract duration T ∗ trades off at the margin the expected
costs from increasing the contract duration because of a lower transfer probability versus
the expected gain from rent-seeking in case a transfer occurs. Note again that the contract
duration can be interpreted as a breach penalty in the framework of Aghion and Bolton
(1987) as it influences the contracting parties’ decisions and payoffs in a similar way: the
higher the breach penalty (or the longer the contract duration), the lower is the entrant’s
profit when entry occurs (rent-seeking), but the probability of entry is inefficiently low.
In our model, we focus on the rent-seeking motive when determining the contract
duration. In reality, however, there are also other factors influencing the contract duration
with differing impacts across players and teams. For example, short term contracts
may be superior when the incumbent team is planning to hire a new coach who prefers
a different tactical system. Moreover, contract durations may also be driven by risk
preferences, by private information of players about their expected future productivity
11
or by changes in the legal environment.20 For similar reasons, contracts may be extended
or renewed before expiry and before another team attempts to hire the player.
Summing up, there are many reasons why the optimal contract duration varies across
player-team pairs, and we will hence observe different durations for reasons beyond the
rent-seeking motive. We do not want to model these different motives explicitly, but it
is interesting to see how changes in the contract duration affect the player’s wage W
in team i. We assume that W is determined such that the total expected joint surplus
under the optimal contract, J(T ∗), is shared equally between the contracting parties.21
Relegating the formal analysis to Appendix B, we get the following result:
Result 3 When an increase in the contract duration decreases the expected renegotiation
payoff for the player or increases it by less than for team i, the player gets compensated
by a higher wage W .
The intuition for the result is straightforward, but it has consequences for the empirical
part. Assuming that the division of the player’s and team i’s expected joint surplus
in the whole game is driven by their relative bargaining positions at the contracting
stage, it is clear that the party who benefits more from a longer contract duration in the
renegotiation process must compensate the other party ex ante. In Appendix B, we show
that the outcome depends on the interplay of three effects, and that it is in principle
possible that the player must compensate the incumbent team. However, the reverse
case where the player is compensated seems much more intuitive and is also supported
by the empirical analysis below: Recall that in renegotiation, team i clearly benefits
from a longer (remaining) contract duration, while the effect on the player is ambiguous.
Therefore, for compensation of team i to occur, the effect on the player’s renegotiation
payoff would have to be strongly positive, which is neither intuitive nor supported by our
empirical analysis.
20For example, Feess, Frick, and Muehlheusser (2004) find a strong increase of average contract dura-
tions after the Bosman judgement.
21Our argument does not depend on the 50:50 split, but holds whenever the wage is determined by
the relative bargaining power of the player and team i at the contracting stage.
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3 Data
Our data set covers four consecutive seasons of the German top professional soccer league
(”Bundesliga”) from 1996/97 to 1999/2000.22 Using the leading German soccer magazine
“Kicker”, we have compiled data with detailed information on contract durations, player
remuneration and transfer fees. In total, we have complete information on 293 players
who signed at least one contract in the observation period. Out of these players, 128
signed a second contract during the observation period; with 66 renewals and 62 trans-
fers.23 For those 62 players who changed teams during the observation period, we have
all the necessary information about the previous (i.e. first) and the new (i.e. second)
contract. Hence, these observations will be used for analyzing the renegotiation game.
The information about the previous contracts of these players will prove useful in dealing
with selection issues. Throughout, we will refer to the wage and the remaining duration
of the first contract as the remaining contract duration and as the previous wage. By
contrast, the duration and the wage in the second contract are referred to as the new
duration and as the new wage.
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the 293 first contracts and the 128
second contracts (66 renewals and 62 transfers to new teams). Note first that, compared
to the annual wage under the first contract, a new contract is on average associated with
an increase of about 100%. This holds both for transfers and for renewals with almost
identical variance. Also, the contract duration of the previous contract is almost the same
for players renewing their contract and for players changing teams.
Second, players with second contracts already had higher wages in the first contract
22This four-year horizon of our sample is due to two regime changes with respect to the transfer rules
in European professional sports: The first regime change resulted from the so-called Bosman judgement
explained above (effective since season 1996/97), according to which teams lose any veto power once
a player’s contract has expired. The second regime change resulted from a decision of the European
Commission (effective since season 2000/2001) which makes it easier for players to resign from their
current contracts, thereby reducing teams’ veto power also when a player’s contract is still valid. Our
modeling of the renegotiation process in the theoretical framework is therefore consistent with the legal
regime in place during the seasons 1996/97-1999/2000.
23Based on our sample of first contracts, we do observe all second contracts signed in the observation
period. Because new contracts (renewals, in particular) signed by less prominent players are not always
publicly reported, our sample captures the large majority, but probably not all first contracts signed
during the observation period.
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 1. Contract 2. Contract 
  Team change Renewal  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
yearly wage (in million) 0. 84 0. 75 1.63 1.31 1.66 1.32 
 
transfer fee (in million) -  2.66 3.52 -  
 
joint = wage +  transfer fee (in million) -  4.21 4.63 -  
 
contract duration (in years) 3.10 0.94 2.94 0.96 3.09 1.19 
 
wage previous contract (in million) -  1.12 0.94 1.18 1.12 
 
duration previous contract (in years) -  3.14 1.13 3.05 1.07 
 
remaining duration previous contract 
(in years) -  1.49 1.22 1.38 1.13 
 
zero remaining contract duration -  0.27  0.22  
 
league games 77.4 91.8 132.0 100.0 152.6 112.6 
 
international games  7.7 15.2 18.6 27.5 22.1 28.9 
 
budget (in million) 37.9 10.5 43.1 15.8 44.8 13.6 
 
performed above average last season   0.50  0.42  
 
final league position last season (1-18)   9.48 5.05 7.55 4.81 
 
Number of observations 293  62  66  
All monetary variables are measured in German Marks (DM), where 1 DM ≈ 0.5 Euro ≈ 0.65 US $. 
There are 10 cases with missing observations for the transfer fee, and hence also for the joint surplus.  
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
which suggests that better players have a higher probability of changing their contract.
This view is reinforced by the fact that the average number of international games is also
considerably higher for players signing a second contract.24 The conjecture that high-
ability players are more likely to sign new contracts will be supported by the results of
the multinomial choice model presented below.
Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics of further control variables used in the
empirical analysis. In addition to the number of international games already mentioned,
also the number of league games can be seen as an indicator of experience and quality.
Player performance in the previous season is measured by a dummy variable indicating
whether a player performed better than the average player on his position. Relating the
performance to the average performance of all players on the same position is useful as
the performance index varies considerably among different positions. The performance
measure is based on a composite index considering both position-specific factors such as
the number of assists per match for a striker, and team specific factors such as the result
24International games are those played between national teams, including e.g. the qualifiers for the
FIFA world cup and, if qualified, the games at the FIFA world cup itself. Since only the best players are
selected for the national team, the number of international games serves as a good quality indicator.
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of a match. We also use information on the yearly budgets and the final league position
of teams to account for team heterogeneity.25
4 Results
4.1 Transfer probability
For all of our hypotheses on wages and transfer fees, we need to take into account that
players who are transferred may systematically differ from those who are not. At the end
of each season, a player either (i) changes teams, (ii) re-signs with his current team, or
(iii) does not change his contractual status.26 We model this decision as a multinomial
logit model with three outcomes. Overall, there are 694 player-year observations for
the estimation of the multinomial logit model which refer to 293 different players. As
control variables for both the decision to change the team and for the characteristics of
the new contract, we use the variables shown in table 1 above. These control variables
include team characteristics such as the yearly budget and final league position in the
previous season, and player characteristics such as position and the number of league
and number of international games. Based on these estimates, we compute selection
correction terms which are included correspondingly in the outcome equations for wages
and transfer fees. This extension of the standard selection model has first been proposed
by Lee (1983), and was further developed by Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Dahl
(2002). Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007) carry out a Monte Carlo analysis of
these estimators and some extensions of them. Based on their findings for small samples,
we use a generalization of the Dubin and McFadden estimator. More details are provided
in Appendix C.
In the empirical analysis, we need to deviate from the chronological order of the theory
part. In the model, we had to work backwards, and therefore started by analyzing the
renegotiation game which led first to our results on transfer fees and on wages in the new
team. In the empirical part, however, we need to take care of a potential selection bias
25Yearly budgets also seem to capture well any variation in the available total (nominal) funds to
be spent by teams on their rosters across seasons (e.g., due to inflation or higher league income from
selling TV rights which is then distributed among teams); in all regressions, including season dummies
in addition to team budgets has absolutely no effect on the estimation results.
26None of the players in our data set has terminated his career during the observation period.
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 Team change 
  
remaining duration at end of season -0.029*** 
(0.010) 
performed above average last season 0.100*** 
(0.032) 
final league position last season 0.006*** 
 (0.002) 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Only significant marginal effects are shown. 
 
Table 2: Transfer probability, marginal effects
when analyzing transfer fees and new wages after a change of teams. Hence, we start
with the multinomial logit model which yields first the results on the transfer probability.
The respective result from the theory part can be expressed as follows:
Hypothesis 1 A player’s transfer probability is decreasing in the remaining duration of
his contract.
Table 2 presents the estimated marginal effects of the variables that have significant
coefficients in the multinomial logit estimation, evaluated at the mean of all explanatory
variables.27 These marginal effects measure the expected change in the transfer probabil-
ity when the corresponding variable increases. The probability that a player is transferred
decreases by approximately 3 percentage-points for another year of remaining contract
duration. As the overall transfer probability is only 9 percent (62 transfers in 694 player-
years), an additional remaining year of contract duration reduces the transfer probability
by about one third. Furthermore, the transfer probability is significantly higher for play-
ers who performed above average confirming the basic intuition that new teams are more
willing to initiate a renegotiation process for high potential players. Finally, players are
less likely to transfer when their team performed well during the last season (i.e. had a
lower rank position).
27We restrict attention to transfer probabilities as this is our variable of interest. The full multinomial
logit estimation results are presented in Table 7 in Appendix C. We also computed the average marginal
effects over all players. The results are very similar to those in Table 2.
16
4.2 Transfer fees
We now turn to the empirical analysis of the renegotiation payoffs. Starting with transfer
fees, the renegotiation payoff of team i, our theory leads to the following Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Transfer fees are (i) increasing in the remaining duration of a player’s
previous contract, and (ii) decreasing in the player’s wage in his previous team.
Transfer fees are zero for expired contracts as the initial team no longer plays an active
role in the renegotiation process. Hence, the relationship between remaining contract
duration and transfer fee is deterministic in these cases. We therefore restrict the analysis
to the 36 cases with positive remaining contract durations.
The dependent variable is the log of the transfer fee, and as control variables we now
use only the number of league games and international games, and the budget of the new
team. The exclusion restrictions for the selection model are imposed by not including
tenure in the old team, above average performance in the past season, and final league
position in the past season in the transfer fee regression. For example, a player’s tenure
in the old team rather seems to affect the likelihood of a transfer (see Table 7) than the
transfer fee paid by the new team. While not a formal test, the fact that these variables
are not significant when included in the transfer fee equation suggests that these exclusion
restrictions are valid.
Both regressions show a positive significant impact of the remaining contract dura-
tion. Given that two of the selection terms are significant, the OLS estimates may be
biased. In the selection model, the estimated coefficient for remaining contract duration
is approximately 0.8. Hence, an additional year of remaining contract duration roughly
doubles the transfer fee.28 This confirms part (i) of Hypothesis 2.
The wage in the previous contract has no significant impact on transfer fees which,
at first glance, contradicts part (ii) of Hypothesis 2. However, despite of using a number
of control variables (league games and international games, and position-specific perfor-
mance measures) as proxies for player quality, still part of the measured impact of the
wage in the previous contract seems due to a quality effect. But then, the non-significance
may be attributed to the following countervailing effects: On the one hand, a higher pre-
28The exact computation for the percentage increase is given by 100 · (exp(β) − 1)) which equals 1.2
in our case.
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 (1) (2) 
 Selection Model OLS 
   
remaining duration previous contract 0.783*** 0.460*** 
 (0.163) (0.122) 
wage previous contract (ln) -0.0158 0.154 
 (0.183) (0.183) 
league games -0.00281 -0.000516 
 (0.00258) (0.00152) 
international games 0.0502*** 0.0572*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0157) 
international games squared -0.000589*** -0.000591*** 
 (0.000188) (0.000192) 
budget 0.0170** 0.0186** 
 (0.00614) (0.00698) 
1( )λ Γ  -0.579**  
 (0.220)  
2( )λ Γ  -5.529**  
 (2.232)  
3( )λ Γ  -3.634  
 (3.906)  
Constant 9.396** 10.35*** 
 (4.541) (2.454) 
Observations 36 36 
R-squared 0.751 0.638 
 
Dependent variable: ln(fee) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Column (1) displays the estimates of the selection  multinomial logit.  
Column (2) displays the OLS estimates based on all contracts signed after the first contract.  
Only observations with strictly positive remaining contract duration are used because a zero 
 remaining duration perfectly predicts a zero transfer fee. 
 
Table 3: Transfer fees
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vious wage weakens the bargaining position of incumbent teams, thereby reducing the
transfer fee as suggested by our theory. But on the other hand, players with higher
previous wages are of higher quality which ceteris paribus increases transfer fees. Our
subsequent results will allow to approximately quantify the (by and large equal) sizes of
both effects, which is consistent with the small and non-significant net effect measured
here.
4.3 Wages
For the empirical analysis of the new wage, recall that it is driven by the terms of two
different contracts: First, as suggested in Result 1 above, the remaining duration and the
wage of the player’s previous contract affect the new wage via the renegotiation process.
Second, the duration of the new contract will also have an impact on the annual wage:
When deciding upon the terms of the new contract, the two contracting parties (now the
player and team e instead of team i) have a rent-seeking motive vis a vis future entrants
similar to the one analyzed for the first contract.29 And as the new team tends to benefit
more from a longer contract in renegotiations, it is to be expected that the annual wage
in the new team is increasing in the duration of this very contract (compensation). To
keep things simple, we did not explicitly model this additional contracting stage in the
theoretical part, but in reality, players sign a series of contracts during their career. Hence,
we must account for the fact that the rent-seeking motive also influences the duration of
the second contracts we observe, and thereby also the annual wage. We address these
issues in two steps, starting with the impact of the previous contract terms on the player’s
new wage, while the impact of the duration of the new contract on the players’ annual
wage in the new team is discussed in subsection 4.5 below.
Recall from Result 1 that a higher previous wage should increase a player’s new wage,
whereas the impact of the remaining duration in the previous contract is ambiguous. We
thus test the following Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 A player’s annual wage in his new team is increasing in his annual wage
in his previous team.
29Thereby, the contracting parties are facing the same trade-off between transfer probability and joint
renegotiation payoff as in the first contract.
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Selection Model 
Selection 
Model OLS OLS 
     
remaining duration previous 
contract 0.0348 0.0188 0.0734 0.0504 
 (0.105) (0.140) (0.0578) (0.0876) 
wage previous contract (ln) 0.413*** 0.458*** 0.392*** 0.471*** 
 (0.0966) (0.114) (0.0913) (0.113) 
contract duration 0.245*** 0.177 0.215*** 0.137 
 (0.0916) (0.130) (0.0795) (0.116) 
league games 0.00157* 0.00190 0.00117 0.000692 
 (0.00085) (0.00145) (0.00071) (0.00103) 
international games 0.00667 0.00676 0.00517 0.00828 
 (0.00797) (0.00913) (0.00729) (0.00877) 
international games squared -3.44e-05 -4.57e-05 -2.34e-05 -6.04e-05 
 (8.51e-05) (9.47e-05) (8.22e-05) (9.45e-05) 
budget 0.017*** 0.0124** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 (0.00413) (0.00470) (0.00412) (0.00469) 
1( )λ Γ  -0.200 -0.253   
 (0.138) (0.157)   
2( )λ Γ  -0.307 -1.254   
 (1.237) (1.553)   
3( )λ Γ  -2.313 -4.468*   
 (1.610) (2.348)   
Constant 5.024** 2.841 6.987*** 6.425*** 
 (1.983) (2.464) (1.220) (1.479) 
Observations 62 45 62 45 
R-squared 0.654 0.616 0.634 0.574 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wage) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Columns (1) and (2) display the estimates of the selection model. Column (1) is based on all obser- 
vations, column (2) is based on observations with strictly positive remaining contract duration only.  
The estimation results of the selection multinomial logit are presented in the appendix. Columns (3)  
and (4) are OLS estimates based on the same data selection rule as in columns (1) and (2). 
 
 Table 4: New wages
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The results in Table 4 confirm Hypothesis 3. On average, a player’s previous wage
has a significant and positive impact on the wage in his new club. This is true for all
specifications. Again, the available quality variables do not allow to fully control for
players’ ability, so that the estimated impact of the previous wage tends to also include
a quality component, the value of which will be approximated using Table 5 below.
Interestingly, the remaining duration of the old contract has no significant impact on
the wage in the new contract. This result, which holds regardless of whether we exclude
players with expired contracts or not, is in line with our prediction of countervailing
effects. Specifically, new teams need to pay large transfer fees when the remaining contract
duration is high, but they are not willing to pay large transfer fees and high wages at
the same time. On the other hand, players may benefit from valid contracts in case of
transfers when their wage in the incumbent team is sufficiently high (see Part (ii) of
Result 1).
4.4 Joint renegotiation payoff
While the effect of the remaining duration of a player’s old contract on his wage in the new
wage is theoretically ambiguous and empirically insignificant, our model leads to a clear
prediction for the joint renegotiation payoff of incumbent teams and players, suggesting
that long-term contracts are useful rent-seeking devices:
Hypothesis 4 The joint renegotiation payoff of the incumbent team and the player
(transfer fee plus wage in the new team) is increasing in the remaining duration of the
player’s previous contract.
Again, we report results for the selection model and for OLS, using the same sample
definitions as in the analysis of wages.30
In columns (1) and (3), we use all transfers, i.e. also those following expired contracts
for which the joint renegotiation payoff is just the wage since transfer fees are zero. In
columns (2) and (4), we restrict the sample to those cases where the remaining contract
duration was positive. Because some of the selection correction terms are significant, we
focus on the selection model. We find that the effect of the remaining contract duration
is significantly positive and almost identical for the samples with and without expired
30Sample sizes are different because there are several missing observations for transfer fees.
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Selection Model 
Selection 
Model OLS OLS 
     
remaining duration previous 
contract 0.454*** 0.471*** 0.423*** 0.212 
 (0.128) (0.162) (0.0781) (0.129) 
wage previous contract (ln) 0.256** 0.164 0.237* 0.230 
 (0.123) (0.136) (0.123) (0.142) 
contract duration 0.234** 0.0519 0.194* 0.156 
 (0.114) (0.158) (0.108) (0.175) 
league games 0.00102 -0.000956 0.000745 2.24e-05 
 (0.00106) (0.00205) (0.000907) (0.00123) 
international games 0.0299*** 0.0367*** 0.0327*** 0.0443*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0115) 
international games squared -0.00028** -0.0004*** -0.00032** -0.0005*** 
 (0.000131) (0.000139) (0.000140) (0.000141) 
budget 0.0204*** 0.0169*** 0.0218*** 0.0178*** 
 (0.00475) (0.00450) (0.00512) (0.00515) 
1( )λ Γ  -0.522*** -0.479***   
 (0.166) (0.161)   
2( )λ Γ  -1.614 -4.119**   
 (1.552) (1.657)   
3( )λ Γ  -4.854** -4.534   
 (1.894) (2.861)   
Constant 5.220** 7.111** 9.011*** 9.947*** 
 (2.429) (3.319) (1.630) (1.813) 
Observations 52 36 52 36 
R-squared 0.825 0.800 0.780 0.705 
 
Dependent variable: ln(joint) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Columns (1) and (2) display the estimates of the selection model. Column (1) is based on all observations, 
 column (2) is based on observations with strictly positive remaining contract duration only. The estimation  
results of the selection multinomial logit are presented in the appendix. Columns (3) and (4) are OLS  
estimates based on the same data selection rule as in columns (1) and (2). 
 
Table 5: Joint renegotiation payoff (transfer fee plus new wage)
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contracts. On average, one more year of remaining contract duration increases the joint
renegotiation payoff of the contracting parties by more than 50 per cent.
In our model, the wage in the old club is a purely redistributive device, and hence has
no impact on the joint renegotiation payoff of the contracting parties. In the first column
of Table 5, the estimated value of 0.256 for the previous wage can therefore serve as a
rough approximation for the size of the inherent quality component. As already discussed
in sections 4.2 and 4.3, this interpretation can also be used to “adjust” the estimates for
this variable in the transfer fee and wage regressions: In Table 4, subtracting 0.256 from
the respective estimated coefficients for the previous wage (≈ 0.4) would lead to a net
effect (due to the player’s improved bargaining power) of approximately 0.15. In turn,
a (negative) effect of the same size would also be present in the transfer fee regression
(Table 3). In combination with the approximated quality effect, this may help to explain
why we did not find a (significantly) negative effect of the previous wage in the transfer
fee regression.
4.5 Compensation
As for the issue of compensation, recall from the theoretical part (Result 3) that, when
teams benefit more from long-term contracts in renegotiations than players do, players
will be compensated ex ante through higher wages. Indeed, we have found that teams
strongly benefit from long-term contracts by receiving higher transfer fees, while there is
no significant impact on wages. Based on our compensation argument, this leads to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 A player’s wage in his new contract is increasing in the contract duration.
Table 4 shows that the contract duration has a significantly positive effect on the
wage when using all second contracts (columns 1 and 3). When using the subsample
with strictly positive remaining contract durations only (columns 2 and 4), the effects
go in the right direction, but are insignificant which may be due to the smaller sample
size. For testing Hypothesis 4, there is no need to exclude players with expired previous
contracts, because the impact of the new contract durations on the new wages should be
independent of the terms of the previous contracts. Hence, we can rely on the subsample
using all second contracts.
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An important issue is the potential endogeneity of the contract duration. At the end
of the theory section, we pointed out that the contract duration is influenced by factors
that are unobservable in our data, such as the relative degree of risk aversion between
players and teams or the informational environment. Therefore, the contract duration
may be endogenous. In order to control for endogeneity, we also estimated the wage
regression by 2SLS, using age and age squared as instruments for contract duration.31
These instruments appear plausible for the following reasons: First, contract duration is
clearly a function of age, with older players getting shorter contracts. Second, conditional
on experience, it is unlikely that age is correlated with the error term in the wage equation.
By the same reasoning, age may credibly be excluded from the wage equation. The
validity of these instruments cannot be rejected by the Sargan overidentification test.
Using the Hausman test for endogeneity, we cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of
contract duration in the wage equation. These results suggest that the estimated effect
of contract duration on wages in Table 4 is unbiased.
5 Discussion
We have developed a framework in the context of European soccer to test some of the
central hypotheses on the issue of strategic contracting. Using a data set from the German
“Bundesliga”, we show that contract durations are useful rent-seeking devices vis a vis
non-contracting parties. All in all, the empirical analysis broadly supports our model
predictions according to which the terms of a contract have both, allocative (likelihood of
transfers) and distributional (transfer fees, wages) effects. We view this as first empirical
evidence for similar predictions derived in the more general buyer-seller frameworks in
previous research on strategic contracting.
Our empirical results clearly support the view that long-term contracts are used as
rent-seeking devices, and our theoretical framework is just rich enough to illustrate the
basic trade-off between higher payoffs in case of a transfer and lower transfer probability.
Still, a fair question in assessing our contribution is if the empirical results could equally
well be explained by different theories. In the following, we discuss several alternatives,
and argue why we do believe that our theory based on strategic contracting fits best with
31The results of the 2SLS estimation are available on request.
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season 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00
average duration 2.917 2.831 3.224 3.295 3.278 3.266
Table 6: Average contract durations before and after Bosman judgement
the empirical findings.
Negative correlation between (remaining) contract durations and transfer
probabilities In our model, this negative correlation is interpreted in a causal sense,
i.e., that longer contracts lead to lower transfer probabilities. A natural alternative ex-
planation could be a matching model with learning where, because of the learning process
still being in its infancy, incentives for early termination may be low. Such a model would
also predict a negative relationship between contract durations and transfer probabilities.
To see why our strategic contracting approach seems superior in explaining the ob-
served empirical regularities, we need to go one step beyond the institutional framework
of our empirical analysis. Before the regime initiated by the Bosman judgement (which,
recall, demarcates the starting point of our observation period), old teams retained some
veto power even after a player’s contract had expired, thereby receiving a (smaller) trans-
fer also in this case. In line with our model, the incentive to sign longer contracts under
the Pre-Bosman regime is smaller, because of the less pronounced difference between
valid and expired contracts in terms of the old team’s veto power. Therefore, our model
predicts an increase in contract durations as a result of the Bosman judgement. Table 6
shows the average contract durations in the two seasons before the judgement (1994/95
and 1995/96) and the four seasons afterwards. Consistent with our theoretical prediction,
there has indeed been a jump of the average duration by approximately half a year in
the aftermath of the judgement.32 By contrast, a theory based on the quality of matches
would be difficult to reconcile with the systematic increase in contract durations after the
(unanticipated) regime change.
Another alternative explanation could reverse causality by arguing that transfer prob-
abilities are in fact independent of the terms of a player’s contract, and that the negative
32Feess, Gerfin, and Muehlheusser (2010) exploit the natural experiment induced by the judgement
to disentangle selection and incentives effects in explaining the relationship between performance and
contract duration.
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relationship is driven by sorting of players into different contracts. Such a theory would
then need to explain why players with low transfer probabilities systematically sign longer
contracts. However, the data clearly shows that contracting parties benefit from long-
term contracts when a transfer occurs, which suggests that players with high transfer
probabilities should have higher incentives for signing longer contracts, resulting in a
positive relationship between contract durations and transfer probabilities. Furthermore,
such a theory could again not explain that contract durations have increased after the
regime change.33
Positive correlation between wages and contract durations In our theory based
on rent-seeking, the observed complementarity between wages and contract durations
arises because in renegotiations, teams benefit more from long-term contracts than players
do, so that the latter have to be compensated for such contracts in the form of higher
wages.
Alternatively, it could also be argued that both higher wages and longer durations
are needed to attract high-quality players. In this respect, consider first the case where
the duration of a contract is not an issue such that bargaining occurs with respect to
wages only, which are then increasing in player quality. However, when bargaining also
occurs with respect to the duration of the contract, then, keeping player quality fixed, a
team can now attract a high-quality player by offering either a high wage or a long-term
contract, suggesting that wages and durations are substitutes rather than complements.
For a similar reason, risk-aversion of players (leading to a strong preference of long-
term over short-term contracts) is also hard to reconcile with the observed empirical
relationship: If player risk-aversion were the primary force underlying the bargaining
process between teams and players (rather than the rent-seeking motive), then players
should be willing to sacrifice part of their wage in return for a longer contract; again, this
33As a further explanation, long-term contracts could also be used as commitment devices for invest-
ments in (general) human capital of players. While such investments are crucial for transforming young
talents into professionals, this motive seems of minor importance in the present study, as all players
under consideration are already full-fledged professionals. Moreover, to maintain incentives to invest
in junior athletes, long-term contracts are useful precisely because of being rent-seeking devices: they
reduce the likelihood of transfers of junior players, and if this nevertheless happens, the team that has
invested receives a compensation in the form of a transfer fee. See Segal and Whinston (2000) for a
related argument in the context of exclusivity provisions.
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would suggest that the two variables are substitutes rather than complements.
Let us now get back to our results from a broader perspective. Because the driving
forces in our framework are not only relevant for contracting in the sports sector, our
results might also be of interest for other contexts where long-term contracts are used:
For instance, there is a recent debate in the European Commission (EC) about how
to deal with long-term contracts in the electricity sector.34 On the one hand, the EC
emphasizes that long-term contracts might be helpful in promoting investment incentives
as firms are facing uncertainty, e.g. concerning future legislation with respect to interstate
grids. Moreover, with respect to the final allocation, it acknowledges that long-term
contracts are not necessarily fully pre-determining as there is the possibility of “secondary
trade” (see p. 183), i.e. entry by another firm (as a result of renegotiation with the
incumbent firm) which tends to improve efficiency. However, on the other hand it also
emphasizes that long-term contracts “...raise search cost (transaction costs) for any player
interested.... This raises barriers to entry.... Hence, both the Court and the Commission
has concluded that long-term contracts should, with certain exceptions, be disqualified...”
(see p. 183). Obviously, this latter argument is analogous to the one made and empirically
confirmed in our context.
34See European Commission, “DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry”, January 10, 2007,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/full report part2.pdf
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Appendix
A Derivation of Lemma 1
A.1 Valid contract
Using the Shapley value, the renegotiation payoffs per unit of time as stated in Lemma
1 are computed as follows:35
Permutation Marginal Contribution
team i team e Player
i, e, p Y −W 0 W + γ
i, p, e Y −W γ W
e, i, p Y −W 0 W + γ
e, p, i Y −W + γ 0 W
p, e, i Y −W + γ 0 W
p, i, e Y −W γ W
Σ Payoffs 6Y + 2γ − 6W 2γ 6W + 2γ
Shapley Value (= 1
6
Σ) Y −W + 1
3
γ 1
3
γ W + 1
3
γ
Note that as long as the contract is valid, team i has full veto power over the player and
can unilaterally force exertion of the contract.
A.2 Contract expired
Repeating the same exercise for the case where the player’s contract is expired, and under
the assumption that the player can alone obtain a payoff equal to his base productivity
Y , the Shapley value leads to payoffs per unit of time as follows (and as stated in Lemma
1):
35The Shapley value is the standard cooperative bargaining concept for N > 2 players, see e.g. Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, p. 680ff).
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Permutation Marginal Contribution
team i team e Player
i, e, p 0 0 Y + γ
i, p, e 0 γ Y
e, i, p 0 0 Y + γ
e, p, i 0 0 Y + γ
p, e, i 0 γ Y
p, i, e 0 γ Y
Σ Payoffs 0 3γ 6Y + 3γ
Shapley Value (= 1
6
Σ) 0 1
2
γ Y + 1
2
γ
B Derivation of Result 3
In a first step, recall that the player earns wage W in team i only when the transfer does
not occur, which happens with probability
g(T ) := 1− Pr (z ≤ z̃(T )) + Pr (z ≤ z̃ (T )) · Pr (γ ≤ 0)
= 1−H(z̃ (T ))(1− F (0)) > 0,
where g′(T ) = −h(·)z̃′ (T ) (1− F (0)) > 0.
It follows that for any T , W ∗ is then implicitly given as follows:
g(T )W ∗ +H(z̃ (T ))
[∫ ∞
0
Πp(γ, T,W )f (γ) dγ
]
≡ 1
2
J(T ), (5)
where the first and second term on the LHS reflect the player’s expected wage in team
i and e, respectively. Moreover, since Πi(·) + Πp(·) ≡ Y + γ−Πe(·), the RHS of Eqn. (5)
can be re-written as
1
2
Y +
1
2
H(z̃ (T ))
[∫ ∞
0
Πi(γ, T,W ) + Πp(γ, T,W )f (γ) dγ
]
(6)
Combining Eqn. (5) and (6) then yields
g(T )W ∗ − 1
2
Y − 1
2
H(z̃ (T ))
[∫ ∞
0
Πi(γ, T,W )− Πp(γ, T,W )f (γ) dγ
]
≡ 0 (7)
To determine the derivative dW
∗
dT
, define the LHS of Eqn. (7) as X(W ∗, T ) so that, by
the implicit function theorem, dW
∗
dT
=
∂X
∂T
− ∂X
∂W∗
.
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More specifically, using the results for the renegotiation payoffs from Lemma 1, we
get
Πi(γ, T,W ) = T · (Y −W +
1
3
γ) + (1− T ) · 0
Πp(γ, T,W ) = T · (W +
1
3
γ) + (1− T ) · 1
2
(Y + γ)
and it will be useful to define the following differences:
∆ := Πi(·)− Πp(·) = T · (Y − 2W )−
1
2
· (1− T )(Y + γ) <> 0
∆W :=
[
∂
∂W
Πi(·)−
∂
∂W
Πp(·)
]
= 0
∆T :=
[
∂
∂T
Πi(·)−
∂
∂T
Πp(·)
]
= Y − 2W + 1
2
(Y + γ) <> 0
Making use of these differences and going back to Eqn. (7), we get
− ∂X
∂W ∗
= −g(T ) + 1
2
H(z̃ (T ))
[∫ ∞
0
∆Wf (γ) dγ
]
= −g(T ) < 0, (8)
since ∆W = 0. Moreover,
∂X
∂T
= g′(T )− 1
2
[
H(z̃ (T ))
∫ ∞
0
∆Tf (γ) dγ +H
′(·)z̃′(T )
∫ ∞
0
∆f (γ) dγ
]
<> 0 (9)
Clearly, for dW
∗
dT
> 0 to hold, we need ∂X
∂T
< 0. Thereby, the first term in Eqn. (9) is
positive, while the sign of the bracket term is ambiguous and depends on the signs of ∆T
and ∆ (which are both ambiguous as well) and the properties of the distribution H(·).
Intuitively, whether or not the player is compensated by team i as T increases depends
on the interplay of the following three effects: First, the impact on the transfer probability
1 − g(T ), which is decreasing in T . Second, the difference of the absolute renegotiation
payoffs (∆) for a given T . Clearly, ∆ becomes negative for low values of T as Πi(T =
0) = 0. On the other hand, as T increases, ∆ > 0 is also possible. Third, the rate at
which the difference of the total renegotiation payoffs changes as T increases (∆T ), where
we know from Result 1 that the total renegotiation payoff for team i increases in T , while
the effect is ambiguous for the player.
Result 3 then simply says that if the net effect leads to ∂X
∂T
< 0, then it is the case that
team i benefits more than the player from an increase in the contract duration. Since the
total joint surplus is to be shared equally, this calls for player compensation in the form
of a higher wage.
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C Selection model with multiple outcomes
C.1 Model specification
The selection model with three outcomes j = 1, 2, 3 can be written as follows
y∗j = zγj + ηj (10)
y = 1 if y∗1 > max
j 6=1
(y∗j ) (11)
w1 = xβ1 + u1 if y = 1 (12)
Let us denote the option team change with j = 1, hence the wage equation refers
to the wage in case of a team change. As is well known OLS of the second part will be
biased if u1 and the ηj are correlated. The first part is a latent variable model which is
used to derive the probabilities of each option. The probability of a team change is given
by
P (y = 1) = P [y∗1 > max
j 6=1
(y∗j )]
Assuming an extreme value distribution for ηj yields the well-known logit probabilities,
e.g. for the first option as (assuming that option 3 is the reference option)
P (y = 1) =
exp(zγ1)
1 +
∑
i=1,2 exp(zγi)
Estimates of γ can be used to generate control functions that take account of the
potential correlation between u and η. Denote these control functions as Γj = f(p̂1, p̂2, p̂3),
where p̂i are the estimated choice probabilities, and write the second stage as
w1 = xβ1 + λΓj + ε1,
where ε1 is mean-independent of x. The different methods discussed in Bourguignon,
Fournier, and Gurgand (2007) differ in the construction of the control functions Γ.The
method we use following the suggestion in Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2007)
in case of small samples defines the control functions as
Γ3 = ln(p̂3)
Γi = p̂i ln(p̂i)/(1− p̂i), i = 1, 2
31
where we assume that choice number 3 is the reference category. The estimated
coefficients λ̂ correspond to σuρiu, where σ is the standard deviation of u1 and ρiu is the
correlation coefficient between u1 and ηi, i = 1, 2, 3.
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C.2 Multinomial logit estimation results
 
 (1) (2) 
 Change team Renew contract 
   
remaining duration at end of 
season 
-0.498*** -0.605*** 
 (0.161) (0.163) 
wage previous contract  0.358 0.338 
 (0.260) (0.257) 
league games 0.00125 0.000611 
 (0.00165) (0.00149) 
international  games -0.00893 0.0176 
 (0.0155) (0.0148) 
international games squared 0.000112 -8.47e-05 
 (0.000173) (0.000163) 
tenure in current team -0.0646 0.0751** 
 (0.0504) (0.0354) 
performed above average last 
season 
1.240*** 0.377 
 (0.325) (0.317) 
budget old team -0.0130 -0.0280* 
 (0.0159) (0.0155) 
final league position old team last 
season 
0.0849** -0.0309 
 (0.0335) (0.0317) 
Constant -6.900** -5.161 
 (3.253) (3.209) 
Observations 694 694 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
“No change”of contract status serves as reference category.  Note that there are 694 
observations because, starting with the 415 first contracts in the data,  we take into account all 
subsequent outcomes (transfer / renewal / no change) for each subsequent year until contract 
expiration. 
 
  
Table 7: Multinomial logit of contract status at end of season
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